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A great deal of research has been conducted on the countries that, in the early 1990s, made the 
switch from communistic societies to capitalistic. After the fall of communism in eastern and 
central Europe, the Washington Consensus was meant to help former communist countries on 
their way towards sustained growth by introducing liberalization, privatization, financial 
discipline and the opening of markets (Kolodko, 1999, p.234). It is safe to say that the 
transition period from communism to capitalism was not without bumps in the road. One 
factor which increased during the transition was income inequality, which is the key variable 
which I will be studying in this paper. Inequality can have many effects, such as decreased 
economic efficiency, lower tax revenues and political instability (Furman & Stiglitz, 1998).  
Gini coefficients during the transition rose rapidly, with the average gini rising by nine points 
over the duration of six years (Milanovic, 1998b, p.40). Furthermore, the spread of the Gini 
coefficients among the transition economies increased, from a situation wherethe Gini 
coefficients ranged from 19 to 24 to a situation where the spread of the Gini coefficients go 
from the low 20s to the high 40s and mid 50s (Milanovic, 1998b, pp.40-41). Most literature 
on this increase in inequality is primarily focussed on economic arguments for why this 
happened. Examples of this would be an analysis of rising inequality in Russia (Commander, 
Tolstopiatenko, & Yemtsov, 1999), an explanation of why inequality rose by Milanovic 
(Milanovic, 1998a), or a paper by Mitra and Yemtsov studying whether further rises in 
inequalities in the transition countries is likely to happen (Mitra & Yemtsov, 2006). These 
cases are just a small part of the massive amount of research that has been done on the 
transition countries. There are however factors which have not been examined thoroughly 
enough that could play a large part in explaining the rise in inequalities for the transition 
countires. One aspect which has been especially neglected has been the role that the 
ideological orientations of political parties in charge can play on explaining not just the trends 
in inequality within countries but also between countries.This is where my research steps in. 
In the plethora of economic arguments for the increase in inequality in transition countries I 
will focus on the political aspects that could be used to explain inequality trends. My central 
research question is: What has been the effect of having left-wing, right-wing, and centre 
parties in power on income inequality in post-Cold War transition countries in Europe. In 
order to answer this question I will first provide a conceptualization of what the different 
variables in the research question constitute, followed by an overview of the available 
academic literature. I will then discuss what data has been used in order to provide an answer 
to the research question, followed by the specific methods used. Following this,  I will 
provide my interpretation of the results of a statistical analysis conducted by me, and finally I 
will provide my conclusion and discussion. In this paper the main theory which will be used 
to explain why political party orientation matters for inequality is the Power Resources 
Theory. Based on my interpretation of the results the conclusion can be drawn that the 
orientation of the executive political parties is a significant factor to explain both net and 
market inequality in the context of the transition countries. 
 
 Conceptualization 
In order to answer the question as to what the effect of left- or right-wing parties was on 
inequality in the transition countries it first is necessary to define several key concepts. The 
most important concepts which need to be addressed are inequality, the left-right dimension 
for political parties, and what the post-Cold War transition countries are. 
The first concept that needs to be clarified is the concept of inequality. Inequality can 
refer to a broad range of topics and definitions. In this paper inequality will refer to economic 
inequality. Economic inequality as a concept however has many different forms in which it 
can be expressed, with different definitions and measurements. The concept of economic 
inequality thus needs to be specified further. One form of economic inequality is income 
inequality. Income inequality refers to the differences in income earned for different segments 
of a population. One important split for income inequality is the difference between market 
inequality and net inequality. Market inequality can be defined as inequality before tax and 
transfers, whereas net inequality refers to inequality after tax and transfers (Ostry, Berg, & 
Tsangarides, 2014, p.6). In this paper pre-tax and transfer inequality and market inequality 
will be used interchangeably, as well as post-tax and transfer inequality and net inequality. 
This split between net and market inequality is an important distinction to make, as the levels 
of both can vary significantly from each other. An example to illustrate the importance of the 
differences is a study conducted by Kenworthy and Pontusson. In their research, Kenworthy 
and Pontusson examined household market inequality and redistribution, and the relation 
between them. Based on their findings Kenworthy and Pontusson conclude that there is a 
strong positive association between changes in household market inequality and redistribution 
(Kenworthy & Pontusson, 2005). In most cases where market inequality increased in the 
study by Kenworthy and Pontusson an increase in redistribution also took place. This example 
illustrates why the distinction between net and market inequality is important, as changes in 
market inequality were partially mitigated by redistribution. In this example the levels of net 
inequality vary less than the levels of market inequality. In order to study the effects of the 
ideological directions of parties in power it is necessary to take careful note of this division. It 
can be assumed that the effects that the different parties have on income inequality will be 
more distinguishable when studying the net inequality rather than the market inequality, 
because the ruling political parties decide on the system and the levels of taxation, as well as 
what transfers are available for people. Both pre-tax and transfer inequality and post-tax and 
transfer inequality will be included in the analysis later. Although it is assumed that net 
inequality is more affected by political parties, it still is necessary to include market inequality 
in my analysis. Market inequality is still affected by non-redistributive government policies 
such as public education or capital-account regulations (Solt, 2014, p.20). In order to answer 
the question as to what effect the ideological direction of political parties in power will have 
on income inequality market inequality can thus be used to potentially show the effects on 
income inequality of public policy other than taxes and transfers. In order to measure the pre-
tax and transfer and post-tax and transfer inequality I will make use of the data provided in the 
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). Net and market inequality in this 
paper will be measured through the use of the Gini coefficient for income inequality, which is 
a measure of what percentage of the population receives what part of the income within a 
country. If the Gini coefficient is 0 it means that income across a country is distributed to 
everyone evenly. If the Gini coefficient is 1 the entire income within a country will be earned 
by one person. It is important to note that there are different ways in which the Gini data can 
be acquired, which can have an impact on what the Gini coefficient in a situation will be. An 
example of this would be differences between the Gini coefficients for the same case based on 
whether they refer to the income distribution for households or for individual people. In my 
analysis I will thus use the Gini coefficients provided in the SWIID. These Gini coefficients 
are provided based on numerous sources which use different equivalence scales. The 
equivalence scales present in the source data for the SWIID are household per capita, 
household adult equivalent, household adjusted, and person (Solt, 2014, p.8). In order to 
generate the Gini coefficients, the SWIID makes use of a procedure which I will discuss in the 
data section of this paper. In the SWIID income inequality is standardized on the household-
adult-equivalent market income data from the Luxembourg Income Study (Solt, 2014, p.12). 
Household-adult-equivalent means that different members of a household are weighed in 
comparison to one adult. There are other forms of economic inequality, for instance wealth 
inequality, that will not be used. The reason why these different forms of inequality are not 
included is that there is not enough data available in regards to the transition economies to 
draw meaningful conclusions. In the remainder of the paper net and market inequality will 
thus refer to the Gini coefficients that are present in the SWIID, unless another source or 
definition is specified. 
The next concepts which need to be discussed are left-wing, right-wing and centre 
parties. Political parties on a left-right scale can have different meaning within the field of 
political science. There are several dimensions for which a left-right scale may be used, such 
as the religious dimension, the nationalist dimension, or the economic dimension. In this 
paper the economic dimension will be used to define what left and right parties are. The data 
on whether a dominant party is left-wing or right-wing will be based on data from the 
Database of Political Institutions of 2012 (DPI), and thus the definition of what constitutes 
left, right and centre will be based on this database. In this database left is: “parties that are 
defined as communist, socialist, social democratic, or left-wing” (Keefer, 2012, p.6). The 
right is: “parties that are defined as conservative, Christian Democratic, or right-wing” 
(Keefer, 2012, p.6). Centre parties in the database are “parties that are defined as centrist or 
when party position can best be described as centrist” (Keefer, 2012, p.6). Finally, there are 
the cases which did not fit within the aforementioned categories or for which there was not 
enough information that are coded with a 0 (Keefer, 2012, p.6). The data was checked against 
other sources. One important note about the coding in the Database of Political Institutions is 
that in cases where the orientation of the executive deviated considerably from the party on 
which it was based the orientation of executive was chosen (Keefer, 2012, p.6). This is 
important because it can skew the results of the analysis, for instance in the case of an 
executive made up of left-wing parties that implement a policy of austerity. In this case the 
executive will be coded as right-wing. It is unclear in how many cases this has been the case, 
but this could potentially skew the results of the regression in a way which affirms the 
research question. This could for instance be the case in the aforementioned situation where 
an executive based on left-wing parties implements an austerity policy, which could increase 
income inequality. In the database this situation would be coded as a right-wing executive due 
to the policy which would lead to a larger correlation in the regression, whereas looking at the 
parties would provide evidence to the contrary. This is an unfortunate element of the DPI in 
regards to my research question that is unavoidable. I do assume however that this effect will 
not be dominant enough to affect the results of the regression significantly, but it is important 
to keep in mind especially in the case where the variable for the executive in power is on the 
border of significance. Another aspect of the DPI to keep in mind in regards to coding is 
Christian democratic parties being coded as right-wing parties. This can potentially skew the 
analysis because the position that Christian democratic parties take up in regards to the 
economic dimension can vary between and in countries. An example of this would be that 
Christian democrats in an empirical analysis by Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, and 
Stephens were neutral in regards to redistribution (Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, & 
Stephens, 2003, p.223). In this situation it would thus be more logical for Christian democrats 
to have been coded as centre rather than right. The DPI unfortunately does not include data on 
the type of parties in the executive other than whether they are left-wing, right-wing, or 
centre. It is thus not possible for me to code the Christian democratic parties differently, even 
in the cases where the economic policy for Christian democrats is not right-wing but rather 
centre or left-wing. This could potentially skew the results in such a way that the effect that 
right-wing parties will have on inequality will not be accurate due to the possibility that 
parties with centre and left-wing economic policy are included in the right-wing 
categorization. The data for left-wing parties should still be accurate because to my 
knowledge no parties with right-wing economic policy are included in the left-wing category.  
The final concept which needs to be addressed is the concept of transition countries. 
The transition countries are the countries which formerly belonged to the Communist 
federations. There were three different Communist federations that ceased to exist which 
resulted in these new independent states, namely Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and 
Yugoslavia, which created twenty-two new countries after their disintegration (Milanovic, 
1998, p.2). There are several cases which will not be used as part of the analysis in this paper. 
East-Germany ceased to exist after merging with West-Germany thus excluding it from the 
analysis. Furthermore, there were six states which did not have fair and transparent elections 
(Milanovic, 1998, p.1) thus making it impossible to study the effects that the different left-
right parties have had on the development of inequality. These six states were Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.  
These were the three main concepts which needed to be defined in order to properly 
conduct the research. Before starting the statistical analysis however, it first is necessary to 
provide the theoretical framework around which the research is based, in order to determine 
which variables are deemed to have an effect on inequality in the available academic 
literature, and which should thus be taken into account in the analysis.  
 
Theoretical framework 
Before starting the statistical analysis on the effect that left and right wing parties in power 
have on the evolution of inequality it first is necessary to establish a theoretical framework 
which discusses inequality and the role that political parties can play in transition economies. 
It should be noted that there is limited literature available on the role that political parties play 
in regards to inequality within the transition economies. There are theories available on how 
political parties can influence inequality, but these theories are often not applied to the 
transition countries. Most of the available literature on inequality in the context of transition 
countries does not take the potential role of political parties into account. Due to this I will 
first provide an overview of the available literature on Power Resources Theory, which is the 
main theory on which my analysis will be based, followed by an overview of the academic 
literature on inequality in the transition countries. This will serve to form a theoretical basis 
for the analysis which can be applied in the context of the transition countries.  
The central theory in this paper that serves to explain the role between income 
inequality and political parties in power is the Power Resources Theory (PRT). Power 
Resources Theory is a theory that was first introduced by Walther Korpi. Korpi defined power 
resources as: “the attributes (capacities or means) of actors (individuals or collectives), which 
enable them to reward or punish other actors” (Korpi, 1985, p.33). There are opportunity costs 
which are associated with the use of power resources, which are split between mobilization 
costs and application costs, where mobilization costs refer to the ease of mobilizing power 
resources and application costs are based on the costs of using a power resource, for instance 
in threats and promises (Korpi, 1985, p.33). PRT is a theory which uses class differences to 
explain developments in income inequality. In the theory the determinants of class position 
and market power resources are capital, skills, and labour (Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, & 
Stephens, 2003, p.197). Capital in this theory is a unique power resource because it is 
concentrated in the hands of a small group of people, which results in a concentration of state 
power in the hands of capital owners (Bradley et al, 2003, p.197). It is thus due to the greater 
concentration of power resources that the application costs of using power resources are lower 
for the owners of capital than for those possessing other power resources, which enables 
capital owners to exert pressure on the state. The mobilization costs for capital owners will 
also be lower because of the concentration of capital in the hands of few, whereas for the 
other power resources are divided amongst a larger group, which makes mobilization difficult 
and costlier. In democracies however it is possible for those who do not possess capital to 
exert pressure on the state for a system which favours them through the organization of the 
lower classes, either through the formation of labour unions or through the organization into 
left-wing parties (Bradley et al, 2003 p.197). The main assumption being made here in the 
PRT is that there are differences in the distributional preferences for different classes, with 
lower and middle class people having a preference for a more equal distribution of income, 
whereas the owners of capital will prefer a higher level of inequality (Volscho & Kelly, 2012, 
p.681). The preference for lower inequality for the lower classes can result in the 
aforementioned organization of labour unions and political parties, where the levels of 
organization vary across countries and time (Bradley et al, 2003, p.197). Labour unions and 
left-wing political parties can influence inequality in different ways, with labour unions 
affecting market inequality and left-wing political parties affecting net inequality. It is 
assumed in Power Resources Theory that increased organization in labour unions will result 
in a decrease in market inequality by shifting power in the market from the owners of capital 
to member of the labour unions, and that an increase in the organization in left-wing political 
parties will shift political power in such a way that it allows state policy to be aimed at 
redistribution (Bradley et al, 2003, p.197). It is thus possible to formulate two different 
hypotheses to be tested based on the power resource theory, which are as followed. The first 
hypothesis is that having left-wing parties in power will result in a lower net inequality in 
comparison to right-wing or centre parties as a result of a shift in power resources which 
enables more redistributive policies. The second hypothesis that can be formulated based on 
the power resource theory is that large labour unions within a country will result in a lower 
level of market inequality due to unions enabling a shift market power from the owners of 
capital to the owners of other power resources.  
Having discussed the theoretical aspects of the Power Resources Theory it now is 
necessary to provide an overview of the empirical research for which this theory has been 
used, and what the conclusions were in regards to politics and inequality. The first empirical 
study which used the PRT which I want to discuss is the research by Bradley and al which has 
already been used to clarify what constitutes Power Resources Theory. In their research 
Bradley et al “investigate the extent to which distribution and redistribution are driven either 
by demographic and economic variables or by institutional and political variables” (Bradley et 
al, 2003, p.193). In order to answer this question Bradley et al make use of a statistical, where 
OLS estimations of the regression coefficients are combined with a robust-cluster estimator of 
standard errors (Bradley et al, 2003, pp.214-215). There are four political factors that are 
included in this research, namely leftist cabinets, Christian Democrat cabinets, constitutional 
veto points and welfare generosity, as well as two labour-market institutional variables which 
are union density and bargaining centralization (Bradley et al, 2003, p.206). The research also 
included several control variables, namely wage dispersion, GDP per capita, education, 
vocational education, industrial employment, unemployment, outward foreign direct 
investment, capital-market openness, LDC imports, net migration, youth, single-mother 
families and female labour-force participation (Bradley et al, 2003, p.207). The independent 
variables were used to determine their effect on the pre-tax and transfer inequality and the 
reduction in inequality. For the independent variables there were several once which were not 
significant, namely secondary school enrolment, vocational education, and wage coordination 
(Bradley et al, 2003, pp.216-217). For some of the other variables which did end up 
significant it is important to note how and the reasons why they may affect income inequality. 
The variables which I will use in my analysis are leftist cabinets, union density, GDP per 
capita, industrial employment, unemployment, and outward foreign direct investment. For the 
remaining variables there is not enough data for me to warrant their inclusion in the 
regression. For leftist cabinets and union density I feel that it is unnecessary to include 
additional information on how they affect inequality, as these variables are covered by the 
Power Resources Theory. GDP per capita can lead to a decrease in inequality in mature 
industrial societies, but can increase inequality when paired with globalization and 
deindustrialization (Bradley et al, 2003, p.203). It can be assumed that in mature industrial 
societies GDP growth will increase demand for labour which provides more job opportunities 
and a stronger bargaining position for workers which decreases inequality and 
deindustrialization reduce demand for labour, which results in an increase in inequality. 
Globalization can increase income inequality in three different ways, namely through imports, 
increased capital mobility and increased labour mobility (Bradley et al, 2003, pp.202-203). 
Increased imports make workers in industrial societies compete with lower-paid workers in 
less developed nations which results in lower wages and more unemployment (Bradley et al, 
2003, p.202). Capital mobility increases inequality because the owners of capital are able to 
shift production to less developed countries with low-wage labour which can lower wages and 
reduce the amount of jobs available, as well as increasing the value of capital as a power 
resource compared to labour and the government due to the ease of exit, which increases pre-
tax and transfer inequality (Bradley et al, 2003, p.202). Finally, there is the increased labour 
mobility between countries, which enables low skilled foreign labourers to compete with 
natives, which can depress wages or cause native workers to be replaced (Bradley et al, 2003, 
pp.202-203). The next variable for which the effect will need to be clarified is industrial 
employment. Why and how industrial employment can affect inequality is not specifically 
mentioned by Bradley et al, although they do mention research that indicates that a U-curve 
exists where industrializing and deindustrializing societies experience higher inequality, 
whereas mature industrial societies experience lower inequality (Bradley et al, 2003, p.203). 
The Power Resources Theory can be used to explain why this is the case. I assume that in 
industrializing societies the supply of capital is limited and for deindustrializing societies 
decreasing, while labour is plentiful, while this is reversed for mature industrial societies. I 
assume that relatively low capital will increase inequality and low labour decreases inequality. 
The next variable which will be included in the analysis for which it is necessary to clarify 
how it can affect inequality in unemployment. Bradley et al argue that unemployment will 
lead to an increase in pre-tax and transfer inequality and to increased redistribution due to the 
availability of unemployment benefits (Bradley et al, p.201).  An increase in unemployment 
will result in a rise in pre-tax and transfer inequality. One reason as to why this is the case can 
be because the employment opportunities of low-income households are disproportionally 
affected by changes in the total of available employment opportunities (Kenworthy & 
Pontusson, 2005, p.454). It is necessary to add a note to the effects of unemployment on 
income inequality by Bradley et al. While I do agree with the notion that pre-tax and transfer 
inequality will rise due to increases in unemployment, I find the argument that redistribution 
increases to be deceptive. The statement is correct in regards to how the reduction in 
inequality is defined by Bradley et al namely as: “proportional reduction in inequality effected 
by taxes and transfers [(1–post inequality/ preinequality) × 100]” (Bradley et al, 2003, p.206). 
I would argue however that in the case where both net inequality and market inequality 
increase as a result of unemployment, with net inequality rising less rapidly due taxes and 
transfers, that a reduction in inequality does not take place. I would argue that this to scenario 
is not unlikely due to the likelihood that welfare benefits and other transfer do not fully 
compensate for the loss in employment for households. The final variable for which to discuss 
how it can affect inequality is outward foreign direct investment (FDI). The reason why this 
variable can affect inequality levels was touched upon earlier when discussing capital 
mobility. Capital mobility makes it easier for the owners of capital to shift the production of 
goods to cheaper foreign countries, increasing the value of capital as a power resource 
(Bradley et al, 2003, p.202). The outward FDI allows us to measure the capital flows 
outwards that represent this capital mobility. Having discussed the different variables that I 
will use based on the literature, I will now provide an overview of the results and conclusions 
of literature on Power Resources Theory, first discussing the results of Bradley et al and then 
the results of other authors that used the power resources theory. 
In Bradley et al’s results pre-tax and transfer inequality was mostly determined by 
union density, whereas for redistribution both union density and having leftist parties were 
significant determinants (Bradley et al, 2003, p.226). It should be noted however that if the 
split between pre-tax and transfer inequality and post-tax and inequality is not made that the 
labour-market institutional variables are more decisive for the final distributive outcomes 
(Bradley et al, 2003, p.226). One of the findings in regards to the effect of political parties on 
inequality is that the reduction of inequality for leftist parties is strongly positive, whereas for 
Christian Democratic governments the reduction is slightly negative (Bradley et al, 2003, 
p.225). Bradley et al suggest that Social Democratic governments favour progressive tax 
systems and transfers to lower-income groups, whereas Christian Democratic governments 
favour being neutral in regards to redistribution (Bradley et al, 2003, pp.222-223). The overall 
results of their analysis affirmed the Power Resources Theory (Bradley et al, 2003, p.227). 
There is however a lot of different literature which uses the Power Resource Theory. Other 
examples of literature are for instance Korpi (Korpi, 1985), Volscho and Kelly (Volscho & 
Kelly, 2012), or Crowley and Stanojevic (Crowley & Stanojevic, 2011). This is just a small 
example of the literature available on power resources. I would like to draw some extra 
attention to the research by Crowley and Stanojevic in the context of the research question. 
The article written by Crowley and Stanojevic is one of the few sources that use the Power 
Resources Theory to as an explanatory theory for transition countries, namely by applying the 
theory to Slovenia. They make use of two theories, namely Power Resources Theory and 
Varieties of Capitalism theory. In their case study they conclude that the PRT has a greater 
explanatory for Slovenia than VoC (Crowley & Stanojevic, 2011). One of the main reasons 
why the explanatory value of PRT in this case study is significant is that the membership of 
labour unions in Slovenia is high, which allowed for coordinated strikes and the mobilization 
of workers (Crowley & Stanojevic, 2011). 
The final section will discuss the available literature on inequality in transition 
countries. A plethora of research is available on the causes of income inequality in the 
transition countries (Commander, Tolstopiatenko, & Yemtsov, 1999; Milanovic, 1998; Mitra 
& Yemtsov, 2006). Unfortunately, almost all of this literature is focussed on the economic 
causes of inequality in the transition countries often not including potential political factors. 
As a result of this it is near impossible to find research on the effects of political parties on 
inequality. One example of literature available on inequality in the transition countries is by 
Aghion and Commander. Aghion and Commander discuss several long-term possible effects 
of undergoing the transition. These effects are trade liberalization leading to trade shocks due 
to the inflexibility of workers, a lower demand for low skilled workers as the result of more 
external input products (Aghion & Commander, 1999, pp.283-284), new technologies that 
create income differences between low and high skilled workers (Aghion & Commander, 
1999, p.284)., and the inability of workers to switch jobs to a job that utilizes the new 
technology and increases productivity and wages as a result  (Aghion & Commander, 1999, 
pp.285-286). Due to the limited data available on the effects of parties for transition countries 
available most arguments will be made using theories which haven’t been applied to transition 
countries specifically. 
The theoretical framework which is established here will serve several purposes. It 
enables us to see the way in which Power Resources Theory can be used to explain the causes 
of income inequality in the transition countries, and as such provides the ability to draw up 
hypotheses on the causes of inequality in the transition countries. Power Resources Theory 
can be used as an explanation as to how political parties can influence the evolution of 
inequality. If organization happens around left-wing political parties it becomes possible for 
these parties to use the political power resources available and make a push for a more 
egalitarian society, for instance through the implementation of new taxes and transfers. Based 
on this theory several hypotheses can be created. The most important hypothesis in this regard 
is the hypothesis that having left-wing parties in power will result in a decrease in net 
inequality, as a result of these left-wing parties using their political power to implement for 
instance higher taxes or more transfers. Another hypothesis which can be drawn up based on 
the Power Resources Theory is the hypothesis that having powerful labour unions allows the 
workers class to mobilize, increasing the power of labour in comparison to capital and 
reducing inequality as a result. 
 
Data 
Before starting the analysis, it is necessary to establish what data was used in regards to the 
different variables, and where the data came from. It is also necessary to discuss the potential 
complications that are present with the data chosen. The data used will refer to nineteen 
countries, namely Albania, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus Croatia, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary. Lithuania. Latvia, Moldova, the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, Serbia, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, 
and Ukraine. 
In the data there are two different dependent variables which will be used separately. 
These variables are market inequality and net inequality. Both of these variables will be based 
on the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) by Frederick Solt. It is 
necessary to clarify how the data used in this database is acquired and what the possible 
complications of using the SWIID are. In the SWIID it is attempted to standardize data from 
different sources, using the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data as the baseline (Solt, 2014, 
pp.6-7). The data from the different sources is used to generate model-based multiple 
imputation estimates of missing observations from the LIS data (Solt, 2014, p.7). In order to 
generate the multiple imputations, the source data is sorted in thirteen categories by 
combining three welfare definitions (net income, market income and expenditures) and four 
equivalence scales (household per capita, household adult equivalent, household unadjusted, 
and person), where the expenditures-person combination is excluded and LIS data for net and 
market income is included (Solt, 2014, p.8). These different categories thus represent the 
different ways that the source data was acquired and measured. If data was available from 
more sources for the different categories the data was averaged (Solt, 2014, p.8). Missing 
values in the dataset were predicted by using different regression models based which used 
ratios between the different categories that were calculated for the different countries and 
years (Solt, 2014, p.9). These predicted ratios were then multiplied by the available data in the 
eleven categories and combined in a single variable by assigning each observation with the 
estimations with the lowest standard error (Solt, 2014, pp.9-10).  There are issues with the use 
of the SWIID however which need to be addressed. One issue that is present in the SWIID is 
the way in which the data is presented. The imputation procedure for the SWIID generates 
1000 imputations, while in the dataset only 100 imputations are presented (Jenkins, 2015, 
p.652). It is to be noted that the assessment by Jenkins of the SWIID is done on version 4.0 of 
the SWIID while the version that I will be using is version 5.0. For version 4.0 a summary file 
was available including the means of all 1000 imputations, whereas this is not available for 
version 5.0, resulting in my analysis using the means of the 100 available imputations in the 
dataset. To my knowledge the average values for the different variables are not available for 
version 5.0 and the dataset only enables calculating the averages for the 100 imputations 
present.  It can be assumed however that for these 100 imputations the means will be similar 
to the full 1000 imputations if it is assumed that the imputed values are distributed normally, 
and in version 4.0 this was the case aside from the estimates for income shares of the top 1 % 
(Jenkins, 2015, p.652). In regards to the net and market Ginis in version 4.0 the estimations 
for the summary (1000 imputations) and the main file (100 imputations) were almost identical 
(Jenkins, 2015, p.661).  Assuming that this remains the case in version 5.0 it can be assumed 
that using the 100 imputations available will not lead to significant differences with the full 
1000 imputations which I have been unable to find. There are however more issues with the 
SWIID. It is unclear in the SWIID how the Gini coefficients are derived from the LIS data 
and there is no clarity on the proportions of the observations that are generated during the 
different parts of the imputation procedure (Jenkins, 2015, p.652). A further point of critique 
in regards to the SWIID has to do with the reliability of the data. The estimations of inequality 
in the SWIID sometimes do not correspond with data from different high quality sources. This 
can for instance be seen in the differences between estimates provided by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies in Britain and estimations in the SWIID, where the SWIID underestimated the 
rise in inequality between 1977 and 1990 and missed a decline in inequality in the early 1990s 
(Jenkins, 2015, pp.657-658). In relation to these problems with the accuracy of the SWIID it 
is necessary to take into account the chosen cases as well. Solt notes that in regards to the 
adjustments applied to estimations for the world’s richer countries: “only in ex-Communist 
central and eastern Europe are a substantial fraction of estimates based on regional averages 
rather than on information from within the country itself” (Solt, 2014, pp.14-15). The result of 
this can be estimations may not correspond with the actual situation within a country, as well 
as the possibility that the SWIID does not represent short trends in the evolution of inequality, 
as seen in the aforementioned case of Britain. A final point to note in regards to the SWIID 
has to do with the usage of the data. I will be using SPSS for conducting the statistical 
analysis. Unfortunately, SPSS does not recognise that the data on net and market inequality in 
the dataset is the result of multiple imputations. As a result of this I will have to use the 
average of the 100 different imputations, which means that I will not be able to properly 
account for imputation variability. The result of this can be that in the regression the standard 
errors of the different imputations will not be properly accounted for. The effect of this 
however is expected to be minimal. This assumption is based on the assessment of the SWIID 
by Jenkins, who notes that properly accounting for the imputation variability marginally 
increases standard error estimates and does not change conclusions about statistical 
significance, aside from cases where the imputation variability is high (Jenkins, 2015, pp.666-
667). 
Having discussed the different issues present in the SWIID and the issues specific to 
my research it now is necessary to detail why I have opted to use the SWIID over other 
databases on inequality. The reason why I have chosen the SWIID is due to the standardized 
nature of the data in the SWIID and the scope of data present. Another important feature of 
the SWIID is that it includes both pre-tax and transfer inequality and post-tax and transfer 
inequality, which enables me to identify how political parties can have an effect on inequality. 
There are two specific other databases which were considered, namely the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS) and the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). Some clarification is 
required as to why the choice was made for the SWIID over these other databases. The LIS is 
one of the highest quality sources for data on inequality that is available, and would thus be a 
logical choice as a source. The reason why the LIS data was not chosen however was that the 
amount of available data for transition countries was more limited both in available years and 
countries. It was for this reason that the SWIID was chosen, despite the knowledge that the 
quality of the data is most likely lower than the LIS data. The World Income Inequality 
Database was not chosen for a different reason. The WIID does have data available on most 
of the countries and years that are of interest to my research, but this data is not standardized. 
The individual sources are referenced in regards to where all the data originates from. This 
leads to the problem of comparability. There is no single data source in the WIID which 
includes all the transition countries, and the sources for countries vary over years. The result 
of this would be that if I utilized data from the WIID it would be likely that differences will 
occur due to measurement and definition differences between sources. The unstandardized 
nature thus made me reluctant to choose for data from the WIID. For the SWIID I assume that 
the data will be more internally consistent than the WIID due to the standardized nature. In 
summary the SWIID was chosen because it was assumed to be the best available data for 
inequality trends, due to it having a larger scope than the LIS data and it being standardised 
and most likely more internally consistent than the WIID. The biggest benefits of using the 
SWIID are that it includes standardized data across countries and time, while avoiding global 
fixed adjustments which can decrease the accuracy of the data (Solt, 2014, p.18). The problem 
of using estimations due to a lack of data is unfortunately not avoidable in regards to the 
transition economies irrespective of the database, and thus the SWIID was still deemed to be 
the best choice due to the combination of available data on market and net inequality and due 
to the standardized nature of the database allowing for a cross-country analysis over time. 
The data on political parties is taken from the Database of Political Institutions by 
Cruz, Keefer and Scartascini. The values, which will be used for the ideological directions of 
the political parties, will be those of the variable executive_orientation. This variable is the 
party orientation of the executive party with respect to economic policy (Cruz, Keefer, & 
Scartascini, 2016).  In the database right executive parties are coded with a 1, left executive 
parties are coded with a 3 and centre executive parties are coded with a 2 (Cruz, Keefer, & 
Scartascini, 2016). There are also the cases which do not fit within these categories which are 
coded as a 0, and the cases where there is no executive which are coded as -999 (Cruz, 
Keefer, & Scartascini, 2016). Because the executive_orientation orientation is a categorical 
value, a dummy value will be used for each of the individual possible values. Another value 
from the DPI is included which is the years of office for the executive. 
Data on the membership of labour unions will also be included in the regression. This 
data is taken from the labour force statistics dataset provided by the OECD. Labour union 
density is defined here as: “the ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members, 
divided by the total number of wage and salary earners” (OECD, 2016). The data is primarily 
retrieved based on surveys, and if this was not an option administrative data adjusted for non-
active and self-employed members was used (OECD, 2016). It should be noted that the 
OECD data on labour unions only included six of the transition countries, which are the 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. This was the 
only dataset available to me that included data on some transition countries during the time 
period from 1990 to 2012. Labour unions play an important role in the Power Resources 
Theory, which is the main theory I am using for the relation between inequality and political 
parties, and it was thus necessary to include them. The model in which I will be testing the 
effect of both labour unions and political parties will unfortunately have to be quite limited in 
sample size because it is restricted to these six countries. If conclusions are drawn on the 
effect that labour unions have on inequality it will thus be based on these six countries,  
The final source of data will be from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
There are several indicators that will be taken from the World Development Indicators, which 
will be used in the analysis as control variables and to include potential indicators of 
inequality indicated by the discussed authors earlier. The indicators which will be used are 
unemployment (% of total labour force), GDP growth (annual %), and outward foreign direct 
investment (% of GDP) all taken from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2016).  The trade variable will be used to indicate the openness of the economies of countries 
and is therefore included. The high-technology exports will be used as an indicator of the 
technological development levels within countries, assuming that more technologically 
advanced countries will be exporting more high-technology exports in relation to the total 
manufactured exports. 
Having provided an overview of the data which will be used and where it originates 
from I will now provide an overview of the methods that will be used for the analysis. 
 
Methods 
In order to generate a conclusion on the effect that the ideological direction of political parties 
can have on the evolution of inequality in the transition economies. I will be testing two 
hypotheses in particular, which are that having left-wing parties in power decreases income 
inequality and having right-wing parties in power increases inequality. In order to draw a 
meaningful conclusion I will be making use of OLS regression analyses. I will include the 
results of ten different regressions in the results section. The reason why there will be ten 
different regressions is that I will be running a regression for both market inequality and net 
inequality. I will thus be running five different regressions for the two dependent variables. 
The regressions used will be the same for both net inequality and market inequality. All 
regressions will make use of data that spans from 1990 to 2012. The first model will be a 
normal OLS regression, where the dependent variable is net inequality and the independent 
variables are the percentage of people employed in industry out of the total employed, the 
outward FDI, GDP growth, unemployment and dummies for the different possible values that 
executive_orientation can have. There will be 19 countries included and 22 years, namely 
from 1990 to 2012.  The second model will use the same dependent and independent variables 
as model one, but will make use of case selection by including a new filter variable called 
executive_years, which represents the amount of years that the executive has been in power, 
where cases are excluded if executive_years is lower than 3. The reason why this filter 
variable will be included is due to the assumption that the effect that the ideological direction 
of parties may have on inequality will not become apparent in the first few years due to a time 
lag. The third for net inequality will be a model that introduces labour union membership to 
the independent variables. This model will only include 6 countries but will include all years. 
The reason why only 6 countries are included is because the labour union statistics are 
retrieved from the OECD labour force statistics, which only included the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. The fourth model will include 
the same dependent and independent variables as the first model, but will also include a 
dummy variable for each year. The fifth and final model is also similar, but with a dummy 
variable added for each country rather than each year. The dummy variables serve as a control 
variable to see if the countries themselves do not produce significant results. If this is the case, 
the country or year dummies that are significant will indicate that that country or year varies 
from the other countries and can influence the regression. If a dummy shows up as significant 
I will include it in the results table, but if it is not I will not include it in the results table in 
order to avoid cluttering up the table. The remaining five models will be the same as the three 
models detailed here, except for the fact that the dependent variable will be market inequality 
rather than net inequality. 
 
Results 
I will now analyse the result of the OLS analyses that I have conducted according to the 
description in the methods section. I will now discuss the results that are present in the 
different tables. The first table for which I will interpret the result is table one, which 
contained the standard regression for net inequality. (Model I), the regression which included 
only cases where the executive party has been in power for three years at minimum (Model 
II), and the regression where labour unions were included as an independent variable. 
There are several remarkable result within table 1 and 2 for net inequality. One thing 
that can clearly be noticed is that for left-wing chief executive parties the statistics are all 
significant in regards to net inequality, and that the coefficient is negative. Based on this data 
it would seem to be the case that the hypothesis that left-wing parties in power leads to a 
lower net inequality would seem to be correct. One very remarkable aspect of table 1 however 
is that for the first model right, left and centre parties are all statistically significant, and all of 
them have a negative coefficient, meaning that they lead to lower inequality. This is 
remarkable especially for right wing parties. Based on this table it can be assumed that there is 
an error within model one, as right-wing parties are not significant in models II and III, which 
corresponds to the hypotheses. One thing which should be noted in regards to net inequality is 
that when the different countries are included as dummies that the values are no longer 
significant for any parties. In this case the economic variables become significant. The 
amount of significant countries when included as a dummy for both net and market inequality 
does indicate that indicate that there are large differences between the transition countries in 
regards to inequality, as was mentioned earlier. In regards to market inequality, it can be seen 
in tables 3 and 4 that for market inequality left-wing parties do not have any cases where they 
are significant, whereas right-wing parties are significant twice, where in both cases the 
coefficient is positive and thus indicates an increase in market inequality. The results of left-
wing parties are significant in regards to net inequality in all cases, except for the model in 
which the different countries were included as dummy variables. Centre parties were also 
significant in the cases where no country or time dummies were included for net inequality, 
although it should be noted that the standardized coefficients were lower for these parties than 
for left-wing parties, indicating that the effect on inequality was smaller. It should also be 
noted however that the R-square for the models I, II and IV lies within 0.4 and 0.5. This is 
means the explanatory values of the models is limited. When including unions in the analysis 
in model III however the R-square goes up to ,745. This model thus has quite a high 
explanatory value. The results of the models suggest several variables for which there is a link 
between the variable and inequality. The most prevalent is the employment in industry, which 
is significant at the 0.01 level in seven out of ten cases. One interesting variable is the union 
variable. It was anticipated that this variable would influence market inequality more than net 
inequality, but it is only significant in model 3 for net inequality and not significant in model 
8 for market inequality. Overall, the data does suggest that the orientation of political parties 
has an effect on the levels of inequality, which is primarily visible in the net inequality tables. 
More specifically, the data suggests that having left-wing and centre parties in power leads to 
a reduction in net income inequality. The effect of having right wing parties in power is less 
apparent, as it is only significant for a very limited number of cases and the direction of the 
effect varies. The hypothesis that having left-wing parties in power will lead to lower 
inequality can be confirmed based on the data in the tables, but only for net inequality. The 
hypothesis of right-wing parties leading to more inequality however can not be confirmed, 
because the variable was significant in few of the models and where significant the effects 
varied. 
 
Dependent variable= 
Net inequality 
Model I Model I Model II Model II Model III Model III 
Independent variables b Beta b Beta b Beta 
       
Executive_orientation=Left -3,279*** -,299 -2,421*** -,293 -2,261*** -,299 
Std. Error ,571  ,767  ,491  
Executive_orientation=Right -2,465*** -,193 -,355 -,039 ,336 ,033 
Std. Error ,657  1,194  ,641  
Executive_orientation=Centre -1,848** -,112 -2,994** -,220 -4,063*** -,259 
Std. Error ,836  ,845  ,911  
Outwards FDI ,049 ,043 ,014 0,019 -,016 -,029 
Std. Error ,052  ,056  ,028  
GDP Growth -,052 -,055 -,034 -,049 ,217*** ,222 
Std. Error ,044  ,056  ,049  
Unemployment ,169*** ,184 ,022 ,023 ,029 ,031 
Std. Error ,043  ,079  ,054  
Employment in industry -,490*** -,596 -,474*** -,688 -,627*** -,616 
Std. Error ,039  ,056  ,067  
Union N/A  N/A  -,062*** -,203 
Std. Error N/A  N/A  ,019  
Constant 46,120  45,836  51,558  
Above: Table 1: Model I, II and III with dependent variable net inequality 
 
Below: Table 2: Model IV and V with dependent variable net inequality 
Std. Error 1,405  1,972  2,577  
R-Square ,432  ,493  ,745  
N 277  88  113  
Dependent variable= 
Net inequality 
Model IV Model IV Model V Model V 
Independent variables b Beta b Beta 
     
Executive_orientation=Left -3,596*** -,328 ,331 ,030 
Std. Error ,603  ,396  
Executive_orientation=Right -2,610*** -,204 ,056 ,004 
Std. Error ,685  ,409  
Executive_orientation=Centre -1,779** -,108 ,283 ,017 
Std. Error ,860  ,497  
Outwards FDI ,010 ,008 -,047 -,041 
Std. Error ,055  ,029  
GDP Growth -,173*** -,183 -,050** -,053 
Std. Error ,064  ,024  
Unemployment ,191*** ,208 -,195*** -,213 
Std. Error ,044  ,049  
Employment in industry -,478*** -,583 -,323*** -,393 
Std. Error ,040  ,066  
Union N/A  N/A N/A 
Std. Error N/A  N/A N/A 
Year=1991 -7,040** -,142 N/A N/A 
Std. Error 2,739  N/A N/A 
Year=2012 -2,971 -,122 N/A N/A 
Std. Error 1,537  N/A N/A 
country=Bulgaria N/A  3,413*** ,168 
Std. Error N/A  ,752  
country=Czech Republic N/A  -2,513*** -,127 
Std. Error N/A  ,844  
country=Estonia N/A  5,906*** ,276 
Std. Error N/A  ,705  
country=Latvia N/A  4,244*** ,199 
Std. Error N/A  ,782  
country=Lithuania N/A  4,520*** ,206 
Std. Error N/A  ,733  
country=Macedonia, FYR N/A  14,965*** ,458 
Std. Error N/A  1,659  
country=Poland N/A  1,650** ,087 
Std. Error N/A  ,690  
country=Russian Federation N/A  11,577*** ,584 
Std. Error N/A  ,638  
country=Slovenia N/A  -4,67*** -,219 
Std. Error N/A  ,770  
Constant  46,823  40,860  
  
Above: Table 3: Model VI, VII and VIII with dependent variable net inequality 
Below: Table 4: Model IX and X with dependent variable net inequality 
Std. Error 1,748  2,318  
R-Square ,475  ,860  
N 277  277  
Dependent variable=          
Market Inequality 
Model VI Model VI Model VII Model VII Model 
VIII 
Model VIII 
Independent variables b Beta b Beta b Beta 
       
Executive_orientation=Left ,036 ,002 1,968 ,128 -,629 -,070 
Std. Error 1,052  1,774  ,755  
Executive_orientation=Right 2,105* 0,115 4,467** ,261 -,671 -,056 
Std. Error 1,210  1,955  ,986  
Executive_orientation=Centre ,565 0,024 -3,812 -,150 -4,855*** -,259 
Std. Error 1,539  2,762  1,401  
Outwards FDI ,245** ,152 ,158 ,122 ,028 0,043 
Std. Error ,096  ,129  ,043  
GDP Growth ,185** ,137 ,028 ,022 ,181** 0,155 
Std. Error ,080  ,129  ,075  
Unemployment ,001 ,001 ,555*** ,305 ,042 ,038 
Std. Error ,079  ,183  ,083  
Employment in industry -,054 -,046 -,029 -,022 -,750*** -,617 
Std. Error ,071  ,130  ,102  
Union N/A  N/A  -,058 -,158 
Std. Error N/A  N/A  ,029  
Constant  43,475  35,836  72,809  
Std. Error 2,588  4,560  3,961  
R-Square ,057  ,217  ,577  
N 277  88  113  
Dependent variable= 
Market Inequality t variable=               
Market Inequality 
Model IX Model IX Model X Model X 
Independent variables b Beta b Beta 
     
Executive_orientation=Left -0,164 -,010 ,442 ,028 
Std. Error 1,133   ,524   
Executive_orientation=Right 1,915 ,105 -,811 -,044 
Std. Error 1,288   ,542   
Executive_orientation=Centre ,610 ,026 ,397 ,017 
Std. Error 1,617   ,658   
Outwards FDI ,254** ,158 -,021 -,013 
Std. Error ,104   ,038   
GDP Growth ,178 0,132 -,042 -0,031 
Std. Error ,120   ,032   
Unemployment ,004 ,003 -,267*** -,203 
Std. Error ,083   ,064   
Employment in industry -,010 -,008 -,572*** -,487 
 Conclusion and discussion 
The research conducted in this paper makes it possible to draw several conclusions. The first 
and most important one is that the orientation of political parties in power did have an effect 
on the levels of inequality within the transition economies. In particular, having left-wing or 
centre parties in power correlated with lower levels of net inequality. This finding adds value 
to the Power Resources Theory because it supports the assumption that left-wing parties in 
power wil use their power resources to implement more redistributive policies. Having centre 
parties in power will also result in a decrease in net inequality, albeit less so than the left-wing 
parties. One remarkable finding in the data was that having right-wing parties in power did 
not result in a significant increase in the levels of inequality in the transition countries. A 
further conclusion that supports the Power Resources Theory based on the results above is 
that having a large labour movement in a country will also result in a reduction in the levels of 
Std. Error ,076   ,087   
Union N/A   N/A N/A 
Std. Error N/A   N/A N/A 
Year=1991 -8,975* -,127 N/A N/A 
Std. Error 5,151   N/A N/A 
country=Albania N/A   -11,005*** -,179 
Std. Error N/A   2,000   
country=Belarus N/A   -8,725*** -,173 
Std. Error N/A   1,241   
country=Bulgaria N/A   -3,333*** -,115 
Std. Error N/A   ,995   
country=Croatia N/A   7,157*** 0,234 
Std. Error N/A   ,978   
country=Czech Republic N/A   8,936*** ,315 
Std. Error N/A   1,117   
country=Estonia N/A   11,143*** ,365 
Std. Error N/A   ,933   
country=Hungary N/A   12,668*** ,457 
Std. Error N/A   ,909   
country=Latvia N/A   13,590*** ,445 
Std. Error N/A   1,035   
country=Lithuania N/A   12,953*** ,412 
Std. Error N/A   ,970   
country=Macedonia, FYR N/A   5,297** ,113 
Std. Error N/A   2,196   
country=Moldova N/A   -8,264*** -,270 
Std. Error N/A   1,621   
country=Poland N/A   10,943*** ,404 
Std. Error N/A   ,913   
country=Russian Federation N/A   9,899*** ,349 
Std. Error N/A   0,844   
country=Slovak Republic N/A   10,865*** 0,375 
Std. Error N/A   1,228   
country=Slovenia N/A   2,414** ,079 
Std. Error N/A   1,019   
country=Ukraine N/A   -9,229*** -,294 
Std. Error     1,083   
Constant  42,317   58,610   
Std. Error 3,287   3,067   
R-Square ,091   ,880   
N 277   277   
net inequality within countries. It was remarkable however that this result only held up for net 
inequality. It was assumed that unions would have a larger effect on the market inequality 
rather than net inequality due to their influence on the labour market rather than on the taxes 
and transfers. My explanation for this finding is that having large unions means that they will 
attempt to implement structural changes such as changes in tax law which will be 
implemented by the political system. This finding however needs to be researched more in 
order to find a more definitive explanation.  
There are however several aspects which need to be discussed regarding the research 
conducted here which may have had an influence on the outcomes found. The first is the 
source of the data. I have made use of the Standardized World Income Inequality Database for 
data on inequality, which makes use of multiply imputed data. The SWIID data is likely not 
as accurate as some other datasources such as the Luxembourg Income Study. The SWIID 
was chosen due to the amount of available data for the transition countries and the 
standardized nature of the data, but the reliability of the data was always a concern. This may 
have affected my results, and when more high quality data becomes available on the transition 
countries this data should be used instead. A further point of discussion is my usage of the 
SWIID data. The statistical program that I used was simply not capable of recognizing the 
multiply imputed nature of the data, which meant that I had to use the average of the values in 
the dataset. This also could have impacted the results. One more aspect which needs to be 
discussed is the data from the Database of Political Institutions. In this database Christian 
democratic parties were included as right-wing parties, while I would argue that they would 
often be centre parties for economic policy. This most likely affected the results for the right-
wing parties, as they likely included parties which shouldn’t have been listed as right-wing for 
economic policy. It was not possible for me to correct for this aspect. A final aspect which 
needs to be discussed lies with the R-square values of the different models used. For some of 
the models this value was quite low. I assume that this was because of the limited set of 
variables included, and not because of the variables themselves, but it should still be taken 
into account when interpreting the results of this study. 
Overal however, it can be concluded that there was indeed a link between the 
ideologies of political parties in power and inequality levels in the transition countries from 
1990 to 2012. The research affirms the assumptions made in the Power Resources Theory. 
The orientation of political parties is a way of explaining the increases in inequality in the 
transition countries which has not been studied enough. It is still necessary to do further 
research on the causes of inequality in the transition countries, and I urge future scholars to 
take the political parties into account.  
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